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Inflation targeting is a forward-looking framework for monetary policy that has 
brought unprecedented transparency to the process of monetary policy. This 
paper aims to assess the degree to which the South African Reserve Bank’s 
(SARB) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has, since the introduction of inflation 
targeting, successfully communicated to the public its policy analysis, and, in 
particular, the expected future policy changes. This paper follows international 
literature (Rosa and Verga (2007), Ehrmann and Fratszcher (2005)) in 
constructing a numerical index that is used to reflect the information content of 
the SARB’s communications, specifically the monetary policy statements that 
accompanied each of the MPC meetings since 2000. Relating this index to 
subsequent policy decisions reveals the informativeness of the index and, by 
implication, the informativeness of the underlying monetary policy statements. 
This method allows us to judge, systematically, the degree to which the MPC has 
communicated successfully, and the evolution of that success over the past nine 
years.  We find evidence that the MPC has succeeded in signalling their likely 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Communication is increasingly recognised as an essential tool for the implementation of 
modern  monetary  policy.  Most  modern  monetary  policy  regimes,  whether  inflation 
targeting regimes or not, identify price stability as their primary objective and recognise 
that  central  bank  transparency1  and credibility are crucial to the attainment of this 
objective.  As a result of the broad move towards greater transparency, communication 
has become part of any modern monetary regime. In order for monetary policy to 
effectively influence economic decisions, it must influence interest rates along the entire 
yield curve, but modern monetary authorities only have direct control over the repo rate 
(or equivalent) at the very short end of this curve. The decomposition of nominal interest 
rates into real interest rates, inflation expectations and risk premia, as given by the Fisher 
equation,  shows  that  the  South  African  Reserve  Bank  (SARB)  needs  to  manage 
expectations of the future real interest rate as well as inflation expectations if it  is to 
influence nominal interest rates over longer horizons. As a consequence, managing 
inflation expectations is increasingly recognised as essential for effective monetary policy. 
 
“For successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective 
control  of  overnight  interest  rates  as  it  is  of  shaping  market 
expectations of the way in which interest rates, inflation, and income 
are likely to evolve over the coming year and later … not only do 
expectations  about  policy  matter,  but,  at  least  under  current 
conditions, very little else matters.”            (Woodford, 2005:15) 
 
Reid  (2009)  analysed  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  in  South  Africa,  with  an 
emphasis on the communications of the central bank with the public. The results of her 
empirical tests of the sensitivity of inflation expectations (derived from market interest 
rates) to macroeconomic surprises, support inferences about the relative predictability of 
monetary policy and the degree of coordination between the central bank and financial 
markets.  Reid  (2009)  found  that  the  evident  coordination  between  the  SARB  and 
financial markets attests to successful strategic interaction between these parties: although 
both pursue their own interests, they optimise the interest rate outcome through strategic 
co-operation. This collaboration has been encouraged by the characteristics of modern 
monetary policy, such as transparency, accountability, credibility and a commitment to 
rules-based policies. This does not suggest any duress, but rather that the SARB and 
financial markets, as players in a strategic game, have decided that it is in their respective 
best interest to cooperate (Reid, 2008).   
 
Even greater transparency could be achieved, as suggested by Reid (2008), if the SARB 
published a forecast of the expected path of its policy instrument. In addition to greater 
transparency, this would emphasise the forward-looking nature of monetary policy and 
thereby enhance the predictability of the SARB‟s policy decisions. Presently, only three 
central banks (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,  the Norges Bank and the Reserve 
                                                       
1 There is, however, ongoing debate about the limits of the benefits of transparency; see, for example, 
Cukierman (2007).   4 
 
Bank of Sweden) have any experience with publishing such forecasts, and the impact has 
not yet been studied empirically (Blinder et al., 2008). Although the SARB does not 
publish its forecasted interest rate path, it is possible to investigate empirically the implicit 
forward-looking content of the SARB‟s communications.   
 
This paper aims to assess the degree to which the South African Reserve Bank‟s (SARB) 
Monetary  Policy  Committee  (MPC)  has,  since  the  introduction  of  inflation  targeting, 
successfully  communicated  to  the  public  its  policy  analysis,  and,  in  particular,  the 
expected  future  policy  changes.    Section  2  introduces  the  literature  that  studies  the 
communication of central banks about future monetary policy.  The monetary policy 
inclination index, how it was created and a preliminary discussion of its application to 
study the SARB‟s communication about future monetary policy are described in section 
3.    In  section  4  the  index  is  applied  to  evaluate  the  consistency  of  the  SARB‟s 
communication, where consistency is essentially the degree to which the deeds of the 
SARB match its prior words.  The information content of the inclination index is studied 
from a number of angles, starting with exploratory data analysis and econometric tests, 
followed by OLS and ordered probit regression analyses. These techniques, jointly, will 
provide insight into the consistency of the SARB communication about intended future 
monetary policy.   Section 5 concludes.   
2.  COMMUNICATION ABOUT FUTURE MONETARY POLICY 
The recent paper by Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen (2008), surveys 
the theoretical and empirical literature in the field. They describe the compelling move 
towards  greater  transparency  in  central  bank  communication,  which  has  the  goal  of 
improving the management of expectations. Additionally, the authors review the evidence 
on the contribution of central bank communication to the successful implementation of 
monetary policy.    
 
According to Blinder et al. (2008), central banks used better communication to increase 
the signal-to-noise ratio of their interaction with the broad public, including financial 
markets.  From  this  perspective,  literature  on  the  success  achieved  with  better 
communication can be divided into two strands: first, research about the extent to which 
the central bank “creates news” considers the impact of central bank communication on 
financial markets; and, second, research that considers the extent to which central bank 
communication “reduces noise” examines how these improve the predictability of its 
policy decisions.   
 
Starting  with  the  first  strand,  some  international  research  (including  Kohn  and  Sack 
(2004) and Reeves and Sawicki (2007)) investigates whether a central bank creates news, 
without considering whether this news moves the markets in the desired direction. The 
second strand of the literature measures (quantitatively) the communication of the central 
bank in question, in order to provide an indication of the direction of the communication 
and to establish whether the markets responded in the desired manner, or whether this 
just increased volatility (Musard-Gies (2005), De Haan and Jansen (2005), Rosa and Verga 
(2007), Ehrmann and Fratszcher (2007)).   5 
 
 
This literature has been influenced by authors such as Romer and Romer (1989), who 
adopted  a  narrative  approach  –  creating  indices  based  on  the  examination  of  policy 
records – to measure the stance of monetary policy. By translating what the central bank 
communicates about future monetary policy into an index, it becomes possible to identify 
the  direction  (and  the  magnitude,  if  desired)  in  which  the  central  bank  intends  to 
influence  the  markets.  Ultimately,  then,  one  can  judge  the  degree  to  which  this 
communication was successful. 
   
Two approaches have been adopted in the literature, each offering different advantages. 
Some researchers, for example, Heinmann and Ullrich (2005), have created an “objective 
index”,  which  measures  the  frequency  of  coding  words,  whilst  avoiding  the  use  of 
judgement in the construction of the index. Other researchers – Rosa and Verga (2007) 
and Erhmann and Fratzscher (2005) – have created indices that entail some judgement or 
interpretation in codifying the communication of the central bank. Rosa and Verga (2007) 
argue that subjective indices are supported by hermeneutic theory. These indices can be 
used to investigate the information content of a central bank‟s communication, which in 
turn will enable evaluation of the consistency and effectiveness of the monetary policy 
communication of the central bank.   
 
In South Africa there have been few formal studies of the extent to which the SARB 
creates news or reduces noise, and these have been limited, primarily, to evaluations of 
the predictability of monetary policy (Ballim and Moolman (2005), Aron and Muellbauer 
(2006)),  or  to  the  sensitivity  of  financial  markets  to  macroeconomic  surprises  (Reid, 
2009). All of these previous studies investigate the movement of market interest rates in 
anticipation  of,  or  in  response  to,  monetary  policy  action  (an  announcement  of  the 
monetary policy decision). This paper contributes to the South African literature through 
the creation of an index that will allow for direct evaluation of the SARB‟s communication 
on  its  possible  future  monetary  policy  stance  through  its  regular  monetary  policy 
statements.   
3.  METHOD:  MONETARY POLICY INCLINATION INDEX 
The concept of consistency is explored comprehensively in section 4, but the assumption 
is that consistency (in the sense that the central bank‟s deeds match its prior words) is 
essential for building the reputation of a central bank. This is supported by Blinder‟s 
(2000) finding that central bankers and academic economists share widespread consensus 
that credibility is exceptionally important to a central bank2. In addition, both groups 
agree that credibility is built mainly through a track record of matching words with deeds 
- that is, through consistent policy decisions that are communicated to the public.   
 
Monetary policy requires repeated interaction which creates incentives for the bank to 
communicate in a consistent manner in order to be considered credible. The relevant 
                                                       
2 Although the responses of academic economists reflected far greater dispersion than those of central 
bankers, the mean response was still 4.23 out of 5, where 5 signified that the respondent believed credibility 
to be „of the utmost importance‟.   6 
 
commitment is not to any given path of policy decisions, but rather to the process by 
which policy decisions are taken. Svensson (2002) calls such a process a targeting rule, in 
contrast to an instrument rule, where a particular policy-reaction function is itself fixed3.   
 
This paper evaluates the SARB‟s communication as a tool of monetary policy. To that 
end, it assesses the degree to which likely actions indicated in the SARB‟s communication 
was followed by policy action consistent with the prior communication. In other words, 
we evaluate the informational content of the SARB‟s communication, using a measure of 
consistency.   
 
The analytical tool used to examine the consistency of the SARB‟s communication is a 
subjective index of monetary policy inclination, supported by the hermeneutic argument4 
of Rosa and Verga (2007). However, Rosa and Verga start by forming a glossary of words 
and phrases that they use as a guide to their index. This was viable for their study of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) as the ECB uses a “very standardised form of language” 
(Rosa  and  Verga,  2007:  149).  On  a  number  of  occasions,  the  ECB  president  even 
explained  his  use  of  a  particular  term.  The  same  approach  did  not  deliver  useful 
information in the South African case where, to the best of the authors‟ knowledge, the 
SARB made fewer explicit attempts to clarify the informational content of any particular 
word or phrase.   
 
We created an index to capture the information (in terms of the  direction of change) 
contained in the official statement after each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, 
with respect to the likely future development of the stance of monetary policy conveyed 
by the policy statement. Although the SARB uses a number of other communication 
devices, including monetary policy reviews and monetary policy forums, we focus in this 
study on the monetary policy statements released at 15:00, directly after the monetary 
policy committee meetings. The wide publicity attracted by these statements and their 
higher relative frequency were the important criteria in this decision, but the research 
could be extended to analyse the other channels of communication in a similar fashion. 
Apart  from  the  formal  channels  of  the  SARB‟s  communication,  it  might  also  be 
instructive to study the information content of other, more informal, communication 
such as comments by the governor at press conferences. Jac Laubscher (2009) recently 
argued  that  the  governor‟s  comments  at  a  press  conference  provided  valuable 
information to assist understanding of the MPC‟s surprising decision to leave the repo 
                                                       
3 However, Woodford (2003) offers further theoretical complication by showing that commitment to a policy 
procedure is inconsistent within a standard New Keynesian framework, except if the policy procedure has the 
additional characteristic that he calls a “timeless perspective”. Policy with a timeless perspective is a decision 
rule that is optimal not only at a point in time, but one that would have been optimal in any earlier period, 
with the present knowledge of the transmission mechanism. From a timeless perspective the optimal policy 
procedure for the economy evolves with our knowledge of the economy and with structural changes in the 
economy. 
4  According  to  Rosa  and  Verga  (2007),  hermeneutic  theory  and  textual   analysis  emphasise  that 
communication is subjective, and its success depends jointly on the content of the messages sent and their 
interpretation by the receiver. Hermeneutic theory also highlights the dynamic nature of language, which 
seems relevant for  the analysis of the SARB during a period where, as a young inflation targeter, it was 
learning to use communication as a monetary policy tool.    7 
 
rate unchanged in June 2009, but lamented the exclusion of such information from the 
formal policy statement.  
 
To limit the inherent subjectivity of the method used here, each MPC statement was read 
and judged independently by two researchers, each of whom assigned a numerical value 
between  -2  and  +2  to  the  statement,  reflecting  the  monetary  policy  inclination 
communicated by the statement. Both researchers were asked to provide an overall index 
value  for  each  statement,  after  considering  the  following  themes  in  each  statement: 
comments  about  headline  and  core  inflation,  and  expected  inflation  (especially  the 
SARB‟s own forecast, the BER‟s survey of inflation expectations and the break-even 
inflation rate from the bond market); comments about the business cycle and the output 
gap;  comments  about  wages  and  labour-market  pressures;  comments  about  money 
supply;  comments  about  external  accounts;  and  finally,  overall  comments  about  the 
appropriateness of the monetary policy stance. Each researcher had to justify the index 
value  assigned  in  terms  of  the  aforementioned  topics.  Following  their  independent 
evaluations, the researchers discussed each report and their evaluations in detail to arrive 
at a consensus index value.  
 
An index value of 0 suggests that the overall message of the statement is that the stance 
of monetary policy is unlikely to change in the near future (i.e. that monetary policy at the 
time was appropriate). A value of -1 was assigned when the communication suggested 
that there is a possibility of the interest rate being lowered at the following monetary policy 
meeting, while -2 reflected communication that suggested an imminent easing. Similarly, 
values of +1 or +2 respectively represented communication of the possibility of an interest 
rate tightening, and an imminent interest rate rise.   
 
For  example,  the  MPC  statement  of  22  April  2004  was  given  an  index  value  of  0. 
Although the statement comments on rising inflation, it was still within the target band 
and the expressions “the inflation outlook over the coming months as well as over the 
longer term continues to be favourable” and “domestically, most conditions seem to 
endorse the containment of inflation”, suggest that the MPC judged inflationary pressure 
to  be  contained.  The  report‟s  final  section  (subtitled,  “Monetary  Policy  Stance”) 
concludes that “CPIX inflation will remain within the target range during the forecast 
period while the economy should pick up momentum”, which was interpreted as an 
indication that the MPC judged the stance of policy to be appropriate at the time.   
 
By contrast, a value of -2 was given to the report following the meeting of 28 May 2009. 
The  MPC  had  reduced  the  repo  rate  at  the  preceding  four  MPC  meetings,  and  the 
following sentences add to the impression that, in terms of inflationary pressures, there 
was, if anything, an even stronger case for a further easing of monetary policy: 
 
“The  most  recent  CPI  inflation  forecast  of  the  Bank  shows  a  relatively 
unchanged outcome for the near-term as compared to that presented to the 
previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee. Over the longer term, 




With regard to output, the statement reports that “GDP contraction was broad-based” 
and “high frequency indicators suggest that the negative trend in GDP growth is likely to 
continue  during  the  second  quarter  of  2009,  although  at  a  more  moderate  pace  of 
contraction” (SARB, 2009). The following comment in the final section of the statement 
cements the authors‟ view that the SARB was communicating a continuation of its easing 
stance: 
 
“The  evidence  which  was  presented  to  the  Monetary  Policy  Committee 
suggests  that  the  output  gap  has  widened  further.  This  is  expected  to 
contribute to an improved inflation outlook, notwithstanding some current 
inflation inertia.” (SARB, 2009) 
 
The  monetary  policy  decision  following  this  statement  (25  June  2009)  turned  out, 
however, to be a controversial one, and will be discussed in detail in section 4.2.   
 
A challenge faced in the application of the inclination index is the fact that the horizons 
between meetings varies in our sample period. The dates of the MPC meetings and the 
resulting horizons between meetings are presented in table I. While the intervals between 
meetings differ, they have mostly been two months apart5, with a standard deviation of 
0.58, suggesting that the range 1.5 to 2.5 months covers the majority (48 out of 62) of the 
intervals.  The robustness of the regression results in section 4.2 to these changing 
horizons is evaluated by comparing the results of regressions using an “event horizon” to 
















                                                       




Note: The horizon lengths are rounded to the nearest 0,5 of a month 
4.  CONSISTENCY 
In  the  literature  (Rosa  and  Verga  (2007),  Erhmann  and  Fratzscher  (2005)),  the  term 
consistency  is  used  to  describe  the  degree  to  which  the  actions  of  the  central  bank 
correspond  with  their  previous  communication  about  monetary  policy  (their  words). 
According to Erhmann and Fratzscher (2005: 7), consistency is a “necessary condition if 
the statements are meant to help markets anticipate better future decisions”, and Blinder 
(1998) argues that it is crucial to building credibility:   
 
“To me, that is the hallmark of credibility: matching deeds 
to words. … Credibility means that your pronouncements 
are believed – even though you are bound by no rule and 
may even have a short-run incentive to renege. In the real 
world, such credibility is not normally created by incentive-
compatible  compensation  schemes  or  by  rigid 
    Horizon (months)      Horizon (months) 
2000  13 Jan    2005  10 Feb  2 
  2 Mar  1.5    14 Apr  2 
  6 Apr  1    9 Jun  2 
  19 May  1.5    11 Aug  2 
  15 Jun  1    1 Oct  1.5 
  11 Aug  2    8 Dec  2.5 
  21 Sept  1.5  2006  2 Feb  2 
  16 Oct  1    13 Apr  2.5 
  16 Nov  1    8 Jun  2 
2001  19 Jan  2    3 Aug  2 
  16 Mar  2    12 Oct  2.5 
  25 Apr  1.5    7 Dec  2 
  14 Jun  2  2007  15 Feb  2.5 
  26 Jul  1.5    12 Apr  2 
  20 Sept  2    7 Jun  2 
  15 Nov  2    16 Aug  2.5 
2002  15 Jan  2    11 Oct  2 
  14 Mar  2    6 Dec  2 
  13 Jun  3  2008  31 Jan  2 
  12 Sept  3    10 Apr  2.5 
  28 Nov  2.5    12 Jun  2 
2003  20 Mar  4    14 Aug  2 
  12 Jun  3    9 Oct  2 
  14 Aug  2    11 Dec  2 
  10 Sept  1  2009  5 Feb  2 
  16 Oct  1    24 Mar  1.5 
  11 Dec  2    30 Apr  1 
2004  26 Jan  1.5    28 May  1 
  22 Apr  3    25 Jun  1 
  10 Jun  1.5    13 Aug  1.5 
  12 Aug  2    22 Sept  1.5 
  14 Oct  2       
  9 Dec 
2 
     10 
 
precommitment.  Rather,  it  is  painstakingly  built  up  by  a 
history of matching deeds to words. A central bank that 
consistently does what it says will acquire credibility by this 
definition almost regardless of the institutional structure.” 
           
           (Blinder, 1998: 64) 
 
(a)  Exploratory Data Analysis 
Visual inspection of the indicator variable and the policy rate at subsequent meetings 
(Figure I) provides the first indications of the consistency of the SARB‟s communication. 




Note: The grey line represents the repo rate at t+3, and the black line represents the index. The shaded area highlights the area 
between -1 and 1, where the communications are not suggesting an imminent adjustment of monetary policy.   
 
Source:   SARB (repo rate) 
  Own construction (index)  
 
The grey line depicting the repo rate at time t+36, i.e. three months after the index value 
(measured on the primary axis), shows  the actual monetary policy decisions over this 
period.  For  a  central  bank  to  influence  market  expectations  about  future  policy 
adjustments, its communication should lead the policy adjustment.  
                                                       
6 The choice to illustrate the repo rate at time t+3 is ad hoc and simply shifts the repo rate line backwards by 
three months to show that the SARB‟s communication does precede the actual changes in the repo rate.  The 
SARB‟s communication will precede the actual repo rate moves by varying horizons with respect to different 
MPC decisions and the choice to depict the repo rate at t+3 does not impact materially on our interpretation 
of figure I.   11 
 
 
It is important to recognise that central bank communication that merits an index value 
of 1 or -1, even if it never becomes 2 or -2, is a valuable part of the monetary policy 
toolkit, acting as a credible threat, if used consistently. Index fluctuations between 1 and 0 
in 2000-2001 could simply reflect uncertainty, or learning by a then newly constituted 
MPC. However, if this kind of communication is understood by the SARB‟s audience to 
be consistent, credible, and conditional on the state of the economy, it could be used to 
manage  inflation  expectations.  It  would  thereby  contribute  to  price  stability  without 
requiring an actual monetary policy change – policy change which could impose other 
costs on the economy.   
 
Table II 
*p (decline/unchanged/rise) means the sample probability of decline/unchanged/rise in the repo rate given the index value in each 
row. 
 
Transition matrices (Tables II and III) provide a more systematic way of evaluating this 
data to investigate the consistency of the SARB‟s communication. The monetary policy 
inclination  communicated  by  the  SARB  is  read  horizontally  in  rows,  and  the  actual 
monetary policy that transpired is read vertically in columns. Table II assesses the period 
2000-2009, whereas Table III evaluates only 2004-20097. An investigation of a period 
starting a few years after the adoption of inflation targeting (2004 in this case) allows us to 
compare the full sample with the sample excluding the first four years, and thereby to test 
the theory that the communication within the inflation targeting framework of the SARB 
became more consistent as the framework matured.   
 
In these tables, we interpret consistency as follows:  
1.  Strong consistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a manner 
consistent with the index value, e.g. a +2 index value is followed by an interest 
rate rise and a -2 index value is followed by an interest rate cut.  
2.  Mild  inconsistency:  the  MPC  adjusts  the  repo  rate  at  its  next  meeting  even 
though the index value had shown only a risk of policy adjustment (e.g. +1 or -1) 
and not an imminent policy adjustment.   
                                                       
7 In addition, a transition matrix was created which included only MPC decisions where the committee knew 
that  inflation  was  outside  of  the  target  range  (i.e.  the  date  on  which  the  CPIX  data  was  released  was 
considered to allow for a lag with regard to data availability).  In other words, all the data points where 
inflation was within the target range were removed from the full dataset.  The results do not differ materially 
from those in the full sample.  Communication of a 2 and 1 became 100% consistent and -2 became 90% 
consistent, whereas communication of a 0 and 1 revealed slightly more hawkish communication than the full 





Repo rate change  
Period t+1 
  Cut  Unchanged  Rise  Total  p(decline)*  p(unchanged)*  p(rise)* 
-2  3  1  0  4  75.0  25.0  0.0 
-1  2  1  0  3  66.7  33.3  0.0 
0  6  14  1  21  28.6  66.7  4.8 
1  2  12  4  18  11.1  66.7  22.2 
2  0  5  10  15  0.0  33.3  66.7 
       
61 
     12 
 
3.   Strong inconsistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a 
direction  inconsistent  with the  present  index  value,  e.g.  cutting  the  repo  rate 
following a meeting where the index value was +2.  
 
From the first row in Table II it emerges that an index value of -2 was followed by a repo 
rate cut at the subsequent MPC meeting in three-quarters of the cases, while the repo rate 
remained unchanged in a quarter of cases. The latter is a mild form of inconsistency, in 
that  the  repo  rate  remained  unchanged  (the  rate  adjustment  was  not  imminent). 
Communication with a value of 2 likewise achieved a high degree of consistency, with a 
repo rate rise following two-thirds of the cases where such a value is recorded. There was 
no evidence of strong inconsistency for index values of +2. An index value of zero (the 
value most frequently observed) was followed by a constant repo rate in two-thirds of the 
cases, and it is notable that of the seven interest rate adjustments that did follow an index 
value of zero, six were interest rate cuts. There were only three instances of a -1 index 
value, and in two of these cases the MPC cut the repo rate at subsequent meetings, 
keeping the repo rate constant in the third case. These cases present no evidence of 
strong inconsistency.  
 
By contrast, an index value of 1 (the second most frequent index value) was followed by 
an  unchanged  repo  rate  in  two-thirds  of  the  cases,  possibly  capturing  a  baseline  (or 
neutral) communication from the SARB, which warns against inflationary risks even when 
they are not imminent. This would certainly be a reasonable baseline for an inflation-
targeting central bank, but it does mean that an index value of +1 should be interpreted as 
indicating  a  neutral  stance  with  respect  to  the  expected  interest  rate  path.  On  two 
occasions (12 June 2003 and 12 August 2004), a value of 1 was followed by a cut in the 
repo rate, which indicates strong inconsistency. However, the first of these two can be 
explained by a correction of the miscalculated inflation figures by Stats SA, rather than by 
inconsistent  communication  from  the  SARB.  The  event  on  the  12  August  2004  is 
evaluated in further detail in section 4.2.   
 
We can test formally whether there is any relationship between the index values in the 
rows and the subsequent interest rate decisions in the columns of Table II, using the 
Pearson  test  statistic.  The  null  hypothesis  in  this  procedure  is  independence,  i.e.  no 
relationship between the rows and columns, compared with an alternative of dependence. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis is evidence that the index value is associated in a significant 
manner with particular outcomes for subsequent interest rate decisions. The Pearson test 
statistic for Table II is 32.13, which is larger than the critical value of the appropriate chi-
squared distribution with 8 degrees of freedom, even at significance levels as exacting as 
one-tenth of a percent. While these results suggest that there is a relationship between the 
index  and  subsequent  interest  rate  decisions,  it  does  not  reveal  the  nature  of  that 







*p (decline/unchanged/rise) means the sample probability of decline/unchanged/rise in the repo rate given the index value in each 
row. 
 
The data in Table III, representing the results for the period 2004 to 2009, is very similar 
to the full sample, with only a few exceptions. Communications awarded an index value 
of -2 or -1 were a little less likely to be followed by an easing of monetary policy than for 
the full period, and communications awarded an index value of 2 or 1 were slightly more 
likely to be followed by a tightening of the repo rate. Communications awarded an index 
value of 0 were more likely to be consistent (followed by unchanged monetary policy) and 
never  to  be  followed  by  monetary  policy  tightening.  Repeating  the  Pearson  test  for 
independence in Table III yields a test statistic of 20.43, which rejects the null hypothesis 
of independence very comfortably at a 1% level of significance.  
(a i)  Inflation surprises versus policy confusion 
Buliř, Šmidkovă, Kotlán and Navrátil (2008: 9) make an important distinction between 
“inflation surprises” and “policy confusion”. They recognise that a central bank‟s deeds 
can turn out differently from its prior words for two reasons: One possibility is that the 
central  bank  did  communicate  clearly,  but  that  the  macroeconomic  environment 
subsequently changed in such a way that the Bank understandably had to depart from the 
policy  direction  communicated  previously.  Buliř  et  al.  call  such  cases,  “inflation 
surprises”. Another possibility is that inconsistency between prior communication and 
subsequent policy might reflect poor communication by the central bank, so creating 
what Buliř et al. call “policy confusion”. Careful study of the circumstances behind each 
apparently surprising decision is required to distinguish between these two cases.    
 
Table IV identifies occasions on which analysts and financial markets were surprised. The 
first two columns show the dates and interest rate decisions that were to some extent 
controversial.  In  the  third  column  (“Reuters  surprise”),  the  difference  between  the 
median of the Reuters Econometer forecast8 for the repo rate and the actual subsequent 
monetary policy decision identifies when and in which direction the analys ts were 
surprised. The fourth column identifies policy announcement dates on which the change 
in the Banker‟s Acceptance rate (BA rate) moved more than 0.25%. This was indicator of 
a market surprise, and the threshold change of 0.25% was calibrated to identify days on 
which  the  markets  were  substantially  surprised.  Using  media  reports  together  with 
speeches, media releases, Monetary Policy Reviews and Quarterly Bulletins published on 
                                                       
8 A survey by Reuters of forecasts made by a panel of professional economists.   
Starting in 
2004 





  Cut  Unchanged  Rise  Total  p(decline)*  p(unchanged)*  p(rise)* 
-2  2  1  0  3  66.7  33.3  0.0 
-1  1  1  0  2  50.0  50.0  0.0 
0  3  8  0  11  27.3  72.7  0.0 
1  1  5  3  9  11.1  55.6  33.3 
2  0  3  7  10  0.0  30.0  70.0 
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the SARB‟s website to contextualise these surprises, potentially allows us to distinguish 
between inflation surprises and policy confusion.   
 
The fifth column of Table IV shows the monetary policy inclination index for each of 
these decisions (the index value assigned at the previous meeting reflecting the policy 
inclination relevant to each decision). This column will help us to distinguish between 
“inflation surprises” (i.e. unanticipated changes in the economy) and potential “policy 
confusion” (i.e. policy surprises attributable to inefficient communication, as opposed to 
economic shocks).  
 
The  final  column  identifies  those  interest  rate  decisions  that  could  be  classified  as 
instances  of  potential  “policy  confusion”  based  on  this  method. It  should  be  noted, 
however, that this column is likely to overstate the instance of policy confusion (it is an 
upper bound) as the index is based on the monetary policy report alone, and disregards 
the other mechanisms by which the SARB communicates with the public.  Consequently 
we investigated each instance of potential „policy confusion‟ by studying speeches, media 
releases,  monetary  policy  reviews  and  Quarterly  bulletins  that  were  available  on  the 
SARB‟s website prior to each of these meetings, to discover any communication that 
might have prepared the public for the  subsequent MPC decision. Such communication 
might  reveal  that  the  economic  environment  had  changed,  or  that  the  SARB  was 
evaluating it differently.  Finally, numerous media reports were evaluated following each 
case of potential policy confusion to assess whether the media anticipated (for example 




Interest rate decision 
Reuters surprise  Change in BA Rate  Index 
 
Confusion 
2001/06/14  -100bp  #N/A  -0.82  0  X 
2001/09/20  -50bp  #N/A  -0.4  0  X* 
2002/01/15  +100bp  #N/A  0.45  1   
2002/09/12  +100bp  #N/A  0.37  2   
2003/06/12  -150bp  #N/A  -0.6  1  X* 
2003/09/10  -100bp  #N/A  -0.32  0  X* 
2003/10/16  -150bp  #N/A  -0.61  -2   
2003/12/11  -50bp  #N/A  0.35  -1   
2004/08/12  -50bp  #N/A  -0.66  1  X 
2005/04/14  -50bp  -0.5  -0.57  0  X 
2006/06/08  +50bp  0.5  0.38  1   
2006/10/12  +50bp  -0.5  0.04  2   
2007/02/15  0  0  -0.29  2  X 
2007/10/11  +50bp  0.5  0.253  2   
2008/04/10  +50bp  0.5  0.237  1   
2008/06/12  +50bp  -0.5  -0.384  1   
2009/02/05  -100bp  0  -0.412  0   
2009/03/24  -100bp  -1  -0.1  -1   
2009/04/30  -100bp  1  -0.232  -2   
2009/06/25  0  0.5  0.201  -2   
Note: The Reuters panel did not forecast the repo rate at the beginning of the period; hence, the N/A values in the first column. 
In columns 3 and 4, x’s are used to identify dates on which each of the variables measured a surprise, and the (+) or (-) indicates 
the direction of the surprise.    The *’s in the final column identify the decisions which are readily explainable and can therefore be 
classified as inflation surprises rather than policy confusion.   
 
Of the twenty interest rate surprises shown in Table IV, seven were identified as instances 
of  potential  “policy  confusion”  (marked  with  an  X),  and  three  of  these  are  readily 15 
 
explicable, as shown below: the unexpected reduction of the repo rate in September 2001 
both surprised the markets and was not anticipated by the index, but should be classified 
as an inflation surprise due to a technical adjustment of the repo rate9 and the September 
11 attacks on the World Trade centre, just prio r to the policy decision. The June 2003 
policy decision (which wrong-footed the markets and the index) was also an inflation 
surprise, because Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) acknowledged on 26 May 2003 that 
inflation  statistics  had  been  overstated  for  some  time,  resulting  in  a  clamour  for 
immediate repo rate adjustments (Loxton, 2003).  Finally, the surprise decision in 
September 2003 was made at an unscheduled meeting of the MPC, following the rapid 
change in the economic environment, which implicitly suggests that this was an inflation 
surprise10.   
 
We are left with four instances of potential “policy confusion” out of 20 interest rate 
surprises and more than 60 policy meetings. The evidence for an “inflation surprise” will 
now be considered for each of these: Starting with the decision of 14 June 2001, where 
the MPC surprisingly cut the repo rate by 100bp.  The degree of surprise can be read in 
the associated 82bp decline of the BA rate. The SARB released one speech by Governor 
Mboweni (on 14 May 2001) and 4 press releases in the interval between this meeting and 
its immediate predecessor. The press releases contained no information regarding the 
inflation outlook, and while the Governor‟s speech, entitled “Volatility of the currency 
and its impact on monetary policy” touched on domestic economic developments it gave 
no indication of a change to the inflation outlook. In fact, the concluding comments 
encouraged the audience to „sit tight, grit our teeth and suffer in silence‟, and „inflation is 
coming down slowly but surely.  Further evidence that the public had not been prepared 
for the interest rate change can be seen in the media‟s response, e.g. Business Day (15 
June 2010) wrote that “Mboweni‟s pre-emptive strike caught even the most optimistic by 
surprise…” 
 
On the 12th of August 2004 the MPC cut the repo rate by 50bp, which surprised the 
market to the extent that the BA rate decline by 66bp. The monetary policy inclination 
index stood at 1 following the preceding MPC meeting. Of the five media releases by the 
SARB in the interval none were relevant for the inflation outlook. Nor did the Quarterly 
Economic Review section of the SARB‟s Quarterly Bulletin (released on 24 June 2004) 
suggest a change in the inflation outlook. Governor Mboweni gave three speeches in the 
interval, on the 22nd and 27th of July and the 5th of August respectively. The former 
contained  a  general  discussion  of factors  impinging  on  inflation (both  positively  and 
negatively) as well as suggesting that inflation might breach the upper bound of the target 
                                                       
9 The technical adjustment of the repo rate on 5 September 2001 was aimed at improving the functioning of 
the money market in South Africa (SARB, 2001) and should therefore not be seen as an adjustment of the 
policy stance. 
10 The international context for these surprises should not be forgotten: During the period from late 2001 
until 2005 the Federal Reserve Board in the USA kept its policy interest rate (the Federal Funds Rate) at a 
markedly lower level than would have been suggested by an application of the Taylor rule – that had hitherto 
correlated  closely  with  the  Fed‟s  policy  stance  (Taylor,  2009).  While  there  is  no  suggestion  of a  simple 
relationship between interest rates in the USA (or elsewhere) and the repo rate in South Africa, the SARB had 
to weigh up the unusually large spread between local and international interest rates against the concomitant 
effects on capital flows and the exchange rate of its policy decisions during this period. 16 
 
temporarily, but nothing suggested an improvement in the inflation outlook that would 
justify  an  easing  of  policy.  The  remaining  two  speeches  did  not  concern  domestic 
economic  developments.    Finally,  the  media  was  taken  completely  off  guard  by  the 
MPC‟s decision, for example Business Day‟s headline on 13 August 2004 read “Markets 
rocked by Mboweni‟s rates shock” and they referred to the previous meeting where the 
Governor had “…signalled at the time that the rate-cutting cycle had ended, saying „the 
party was over‟”.  SARB Press releases, speeches or other communications accessible to 
the media did not therefore prepare the public for the policy decision of 12 August 2004.  
 
The  circumstances  surrounding  the  policy  decision  of  12  August  2004  were  further 
clouded by the arrival of a delegation of trade union representatives and management 
from the Chamber of Mines at the SARB on the final day of the MP meeting. Their 
purpose was to hand a memorandum to the Governor “demanding immediate steps to 
weaken the currency‟s value” (Phasiwe, 2004). Interrupting an MPC meeting to meet with 
a delegation intending to pressurise the committee was, with the benefit of hindsight, 
probably an error of judgment. It was doubly regrettable since the MPC surprised the 
markets by lowering the repo rate at that meeting (Laubscher, 2009). The confluence of a 
surprising repo rate reduction with an inappropriate accommodation of interest groups 
pressurising for just such a decision might have undermined the perceived independence 
of the SARB.   
 
On the 14th of April 2005 the MPC cut the repo rate by 50bp, which caused a market 
surprise that pushed the BA rate down by 57bp and was 50bp below the expectations 
summarised  in  the  Reuter  econometer.  While  the  December  2004  SARB  Quarterly 
Bulletin referred to moderating inflation it also mentioned firm economic growth, giving 
no clear indication of an change in the assessment on the domestic outlook. Certainly, the 
media did not anticipate the policy adjustment, with the Business Day observing that “… 
last  week‟s  statement  has  had  analysts  reading  between  and  beneath  the  lines  in  an 
attempt to puzzle out what really motivated the committee.” 
 
On the 15th of February 2007 the MPC kept the repo rate constant, in line with the 
expectations  summarised  by  the  Reuters  Econometer),  but  not  in  line  market 
expectations where the surprise could be read in the associated 29bp BA rate decline. The 
monetary policy inclination index stood at plus 2, suggesting an imminent rate rise. In the 
interval between this meeting and it‟s predecessor the SARB released a Quarterly Bulletin 
which  referred  to  a  „robust  economy‟  where  „domestic  expenditure  continued  on  its 
robust  expansion  path‟,  wages  were  edging  higher  and  CPIX  that  had  „picked  up 
significantly‟ although it „remained well within the target area‟.  While this description of 
the economy does not itself suggest an imminent rate rise, it does not contradict the 
preceding monetary policy statement where that intention was more clearly flagged. In 
this instance the press was not as sharply critical of the MPC‟s decision, though they did 
nit report any prior information that suggested circumstances or their analysis thereof had 
changed since the previous meeting.   
 
In summary, the evidence suggests that one four occasions (June 2001, August 2004, 
April 2005 and October 2007) the MPC‟s decisions were surprising for reasons not easily 17 
 
attributable to changing economic circumstances11, at least not as communicated by the 
SARB to the public in any of the platforms analysed here.  Given that the method used in 
this paper is likely to overstate the number of interest rate surprises, the evidence suggests 
that the SARB has communicated its intentions about the future direction of policy with 
considerable success over the period studied.  
(a ii)  Turning points   
Some of the most challenging policy decisions which the MPC has had to communicate 
were the turning points of the policy cycles - 14 June 2001, 15 January 2002, 12 June 2003, 
8 June 2006 and 11 December 2008. The second and third turning points (15 January 2002 
and 12 June 2003) coincided with inflation surprises discussed in the previous section, so it 
is inappropriate to assign these to poor communication. However, the first turning point 
(14 June 2001) was clearly a substantial surprise to financial markets and was not predicted 
by the index (see Table IV). The fourth (8 June 2006) surprised the Reuters panel, financial 
markets, and elicited media criticism (Joffe, 2006). In this case, the index corresponding to 
this policy decision was 1, also indicating mild inconsistency. The final turning point (11 
December 2008) is interesting in that it did not surprise the Reuters panel or financial 
markets much (it is therefore not identified in Table IV), but the index did not predict the 
turning point at all (the index value was 0). In summary, the SARB has found it much more 
difficult to communicate likely turning points in the interest rate cycle, an unsurprising 
result given the inherent difficulty of the decisions involved.   
 
(b) Regression analysis 
In this section, the approach of Rosa and Verga (2007) is adopted to begin a process of 
describing  the  information  content  of  the  index.  Firstly,  the  change  in  the  SARB‟s 
instrument rate (the repo rate) is regressed on the index variable, while controlling for the 
technical adjustment of September 2001 with a dummy variable.  
 
(Repot+m – Repot) = α + βtIndex + βtTech_adjt +ɛt 
 
The results of the regressions for m=1 to m = 6 (i.e. the change in the repo rate between 
time t and the repo rates one, two, three, four, five and six months later) are presented in 
Table Va. The estimates for the coefficient on the variable “index” should provide an 
indication of the relationship between the change in the actual repo rate and the index 
value, or the amount of information provided by the index on future monetary policy 
decisions.   
 
                                                       
11 Mention should also be made of the case of June 2006: although our method does not identify it as 
potential policy confusion.  The media lamented the lack of transparency surrounding the monetary policy 
decision, claiming that despite warnings of a possible rate hike by the Governor of the South African Reserve 
Bank, the available data and the Reserve Bank‟s communication had not convinced the market that the threat 
was credible (Joffe, 2006).  Although our index did reflect that the SARB had communicated the possibility of 
a rise in the future (an index value of 1), the Reuters Econometer was surprised by 0.5 and the BA rate by 
0.38, reflecting that they had not believed the rise was imminent. 18 
 
Table Va 
  m=1  m=2  m=3  m=4  m=5  m=6 
Constant  -0.021  -0.257***  -0.458***  -0.604***  -0.743***  -0.819*** 
Index  0.010  0.271***  0.444***  0.570***  0.723***  0.814*** 
Tech_adj  0.010  -0.014  0.015  1.034***  1.020***  2.005*** 
R-squared  0.006  0.351  0.330  0.351  0.348  0.328 
observations  58  58  58  58  58  58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using the index and a dummy variable for the technical adjustment as explanatory 
variables. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
The weak results for m=1 can be explained by the fact that most of the MPC meetings 
took place every second month, so there is very little movement in the dependent variable 
at t+1 (one month after the statement). From m=2 to m=6, the coefficient estimates of 
the index are positive and significant (increasing in size as the horizon lengthens), and the 
R-squared is between 0.328 and 0.351, which suggests that the index does indeed have 
informational content12.   
 
The coefficient on the index suggests that a statement which signalled an imminent 
monetary policy tightening (an index value of 2) was on average followed by 50 and 100 
basis point increases in the repo rate within the following two and four   months 
respectively. These coefficients are larger in magnitude than those estimated by Rosa and 
Verga (2007) for the ECB, which is unsurprising as the monetary policy adjustments by 
the SARB (in the context of an emerging market economy) are usually greater than those 
of the ECB. In line with the results of Rosa and Verga (2007), the constant was negative 
and significant at all horizons, which could reflect that the communication tended to 
emphasise greater inflation risk (tendency toward monetary policy  tightening) than what 
usually materialised.   
 
As a robustness check, the regressions were estimated with alternative index values 
independently scored by Reid prior to consultation with Du Plessis. These results (shown 
in Table Vb) do not differ substantially from the combined index13.   
 
Secondly, OLS regressions using dummy variables for each of the five possible index 
values, rather than a continuous variable “index”, were estimated to determine whether 
the values of the index displayed a cardinal or ordinal relationship. This will provide 
insight into how this index can be used appropriately in further studies.  Again, the 
technical  adjustment  of  September  2001  was  controlled  for  by  including  a  dummy 
variable.   
 
(Repot+m – Repot) = β1D-2 + β2D-1 + β3D0 + β4D1 + β5D2 + β6Tech_adjt + ɛt 
                                                       
12 The regressions were estimated with alternative index values independently scored by the first author prior 
to consultation with the second author.  These results (shown in the appendix) do not differ substantially 
from the combined index, which suggests that the results are robust despite the subjective nature of the 
index.   
13 As with the transition matrix, this regression was re-run including only points where inflation was outside 




  m=1  m=2  m=3  m=4  m=5  m=6 
D -2,t  0  -1.50***(NA)  -1.50***(NA)  -2.00***(NA)  -2.00***(NA)  -2.00***(NA) 
D -1,t  0  -0.50**  -0.83  -1.17  -1.17  -1.17 
D 0,t  -0.04  -0.20*  -0.45***  -0.62**  -0.86***  -0.95*** 
D 1,t  0  0.03  -0.03  0.06  0.06  -0.03 
D 2,t  0  0.23***  0.43***  0.47***  0.70***  0.90*** 
Tech_adj  0  -0.03  0.03  0.94***  0.94***  2.03*** 
R-squared  0.02  0.41  0.33  0.36  0.36  0.34 
observations  58  58  58  58  58  58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using dummy variables for each of the index values and a dummy variable for the 
technical adjustment, as explanatory variables. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * 
indicate that a variable is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
Again, m=1 is uninformative due to the fact that most of the MPC meetings are two 
months apart. The regression outputs show that the coefficients on three of the index 
values (-2, 0, 2) are significant, suggesting that these values of the index contain fairly 
reliable information. The signs of the coefficients on the dummy variable for index values 
-2  and  2  are  as  expected,  but  the  coefficient  for  the  index  value  0  is  negative  and 
significant (although much smaller than the coefficients for -1 and -2). This supports the 
interpretation  following  the  regression  using  the  continuous  variable  “index”,  that 
communications have a slight bias towards overstating the inflation risk.   
 
Wald tests were used to determine whether the index was ordinal or cardinal in nature 
(whether a 2 (-2) reflects double the upward (downward) inflation risk that a 1 (-1) does).   
 




was firmly rejected at all horizons, suggesting that the relationship between the 
coefficients (different values of the index) is ordinal, but not cardinal.   
 
This outcome and the fact that the index comprises discrete outcomes motivated the use 
of an ordered probit model to further test the robustness of the results. Due to the 
previous  conclusion  that  the  index  values  have  an  ordinal  rather  than  cardinal 
relationship, this ordered probit contained the dummy variables for each index value, and 
the technical adjustment, as regressors.  
 
The dependent variable in the OLS regression was the interest rate change over fixed 
calendar periods (2 months, 3 months, etc,). In contrast, the dependent variable in the 
ordered probit model is interest rate change between successive meetings, with these 
meetings spaced irregularly over the calendar. The consistent results for the two models 
show, however, that our inference does not depend on either of the two expressions for 
changes to the interest rate path.   
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The ordered probit results were then used to investigate the number of type I and II 
errors that arose from the regression model.   
 
Table VII 
Index prediction  True positives  False positives  True negatives  False negatives 

























Table V summarises the predictive ability of the ordered probit model based on the index 
values  described  above.  There  are  three  rows  in  the  table,  each  of  which  considers 
potential type I and II errors by the model with respect to the following predictions: an 
interest rate decline (in row 1), an unchanged interest rate (row 2) and an interest rate rise 
(row 3). The first two data columns show the proportion of true and false positives, e.g. 
in 71.4% of the cases where the model predicted an interest rate cut, an actual interest 
rate cut followed at the subsequent meeting. In two-thirds of the cases where the model 
predicted an interest rate rise, the MPC raised the repo rate at the subsequent meeting. 
The second column provides an empirical estimate of the model‟s type I forecasting 
error, and the highest type I error is 35% for the “unchanged” signal.  
 
The final two data columns show the proportion of true and false negatives, e.g. in 83% 
of the cases where the model suggested there would not be an interest rate cut, the MPC 
did not reduce the repo rate at their next meeting, and in 89.4% of the cases where the 
model suggested there would not be an interest rate rise, the MPC followed suit. The final 
column is, therefore, an empirical estimate of the model‟s type II prediction error for the 
three relevant categories. It is encouraging that the type II error never rises above 32%.   
 
Finally, it is notable that the type I and II errors are both highest for the model‟s ability to 
predict no change in the repo rate. An index value of zero should therefore be interpreted 
as indicating (i) that the MPC did not communicate a likely future change in the policy 
stance  and  (ii)  uncertainty  about  the  likely  future  policy  direction.  Positive  signals, 
whether  indicating  a  likely  rise  or  decline  in  the  repo  rate,  seem  to  have  been 
communicated with greater accuracy. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The role of communication is widely recognised as a valuable tool for the implementation 
of modern monetary policy, but research has tended to focus more on the effects of the 
actions of central banks, rather than their communication. A numerical index was constructed 
to reflect the monetary policy inclination communicated by the SARB‟s MPC statements. 
This index was applied in a number of ways to investigate the nature and success of the 
communication of the SARB. Exploratory data analysis and formal econometric tests 
revealed  commendable  consistency  in  the  communication  contained  in  the  MPC 
statements,  which  was  supported  by  more  formal  regression  analyses.  Our  evidence 21 
 
suggests that the MPC has succeeded in signalling its likely future policy decisions with 




  M=1  M=2  M=3  M=4  M=5  M=6 
Const  -0.020  -0.225**  -0.398***  -0.523***  -0.632***  -0.684*** 
Index 
0.010  0.259***  0.410***  0.522***  0.649***  0.717*** 
Tech_adj 
0.020  0.225**  0.398***  0.152***  1.632***  2.684*** 
R-squared  0.007  0.427  0.378  0.391  0.374  0.338 
Observations  58  58  58  58  58  58 
Note: OLS regressions at various horizons, using Reid’s index and a dummy variable for the Tech_adj(technical adjustment), as 
regressors. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * represent that a variable is significant at 
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